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1. Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that for most rms in nancial distress, debt
and equity holders agree|either voluntarily or as part of a Chapter 11
process|to restructure the rm's capital thereby allowing the rm to con-
tinue operation, see Weiss (1990), Gilson et al. (1990), and Morse and Shaw
(1988). We consider a dynamic capital structure model in which the going
concern value of the rm makes debt renegotiation optimal for debt and eq-
uity holders. If the rm is in nancial distress, the equity holders can make a
take-it-or-leave-it oer to the existing debt holders in order to reestablish an
optimal capital structure for the rm. The debt holders always have the op-
tion to reject the oer, but their decision whether to accept or reject depends
on what they anticipate will happen if they reject. A critical feature of our
model is that debt holders do not accept oers from equity holders which are
not credible. An example of a non-credible threat is if equity holders threaten
to liquidate the rm even if it would be better for them to keep servicing the
existing debt. In equilibrium, the equity holders only make renegotiation of-
fers which are accepted by the debt holders, but the o-the-equilibrium-path
rejection values of debt and equity are the key in determining the equilib-
rium oer. We nd that debt holders rationally accept deviations from the
absolute priority rule as the outcome of the renegotiation game. The intu-
ition is that equity holders know that non-credible threats will be rejected by
debt holders and, hence, equity holders postpone their renegotiation oer to
the point at which liquidation becomes a credible threat. At this point it is
rational for the debt holders to accept deviations from the absolute priority
rule, since liquidation is the alternative.
We also allow for callable debt and reissuance of debt when the rm
does well and, hence, our model extends and unies several strands of the
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literature on dynamic capital structure. Compared to existing models, the
combination of renegotiation and callability signicantly increases the tax
advantage to debt.
We consider a rm with a simple capital structure consisting of equity and
a single class of callable perpetual debt. Following Goldstein et al. (2001),
we use the rm's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as the driving
state variable. For an initial level of EBIT, an optimal capital structure is
chosen to maximize rm value by trading o the tax advantage to debt, the
cost of nancial distress, and future restructuring costs. Subsequent to the
issuance of debt and equity, the equity holders continuously decide whether
to continue servicing the existing debt or to restructure the rm's capital. As
the rm's EBIT increases, equity holders prefer more debt to better exploit
the tax shield. As the rm's EBIT decreases, the equity holders prefer less
debt in order to reduce the cost of nancial distress. The initial values of
debt and equity rationally reect the equity holders' ex-post incentives to
restructure as well as the payos received if restructuring occurs.
For reasons that will be explained when we dene our model, we solve for
debt and equity values in a case where there are nitely many renegotiation
options. The starting point is rst to solve a case with no renegotiation
possibility at the lower boundary. This benchmark case is comparable to
Goldstein et al. (2001), and is in accordance with classical models such as
Black and Cox (1976), Merton (1974), and Leland (1994). In these models,
the rm is liquidated at the lower boundary, and the tax advantage to debt
is lost permanently. Our benchmark model deviates from these models by
assuming that the value of the rm's production technology in liquidation is
equal to the value for a new entrepreneur who can start afresh and optimally
lever the rm's assets.
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With debt renegotiation, equity holders may continue to service the debt
after a rejection by the debt holders. To handle this, we need a friction that
leaves the rm in a dierent shape after one renegotiation round consisting
of an oer, a rejection, and a continuation of debt service. The friction is
the loss of one renegotiation option, which brings the rm one step closer
to the case with forced liquidation at the lower boundary. This friction is
similar in spirit to the nite number of sequential oers renement of the
Nash equilibria in the Rubinstein bargaining game, cf. Rubinstein (1982,
1987).
Our model shares an important feature with strategic debt service mod-
els, cf. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997),
Hege and Mella-Barral (2005), and Hackbarth et al. (2007): When liquida-
tion is costly, the debt and equity holders have a common interest in saving
the costs of bankruptcy. There are two key dierences between our debt
renegotiation model and the strategic debt service models. First, in strategic
debt service models, a failed renegotiation proposal leads to a forced liqui-
dation of the rm. They rule out the possibility that equity holders may
continue servicing the debt with the existing coupon payments, i.e., that the
assumed bankruptcy threat to force concessions from the debt holders may
not be a credible threat. In our model, we insist on credible threats which
forces equity holders to postpone their restructuring oer. Second, in the
strategic debt service models, there is no restructuring of the rm's capital|
the equity holders only bargain in order to obtain temporary coupon relief.
Francois and Morellec (2004), Galai et al. (2007), and Broadie et al. (2007)
look at settings in which debt is not serviced while in Chapter 11, but the
(original) coupon must be paid if the rm leaves Chapter 11. These papers
incorporate important aspects of the Chapter 11 code, e.g., the automatic
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stay, but a successful exit of Chapter 11 does not solve the underlying capital
structure (nancial distress) problem. Annabi et al. (2010) consider the out-
come of Chapter 11 as a non-cooperative game. They focus on the judge's
role, and the random intervention leads to a game in multiple rounds, but
they do not consider the rm's optimal capital structure.
Goldstein et al. (2001) nd that their dynamic capital structure model
gives lower leverage ratios than static capital structure models, ceteris paribus,
since the rm can subsequently increase its outstanding debt, if EBIT in-
creases suciently. By adding debt renegotiation to the model, we nd that
leverage ratios increase compared to the results of Goldstein et al. (2001).
This is due to the fact that debt renegotiation reduces the negative impact of
nancial distress relatively to a setting in which liquidation is the only out-
come of nancial distress. The introduction of debt renegotiations increases
the tax advantage to debt by 50% relative to a dynamic capital structure
model with no debt renegotiation for realistic parameter values.
Our model gives a simple explanation of the violation of the absolute
priority rule for rms in nancial distress. Such violations are well docu-
mented in the empirical literature, see Weiss (1990), Eberhart et al. (1990b),
Betker (1995), Bris et al. (2006), and Altman and Hotchkiss (2010). On
the equilibrium path, it is perfectly rational for the debt holders to accept
a renegotiation proposal from the equity holders which leaves some value to
the equity holders even though the debt holders do not recover their full prin-
cipal. The reason is that a rejection by the debt holders does not necessarily
force an immediate liquidation of the rm. Equity holders may continue ser-
vicing the debt with the promised coupon until the conditions become even
worse. We show that equity holders' bargaining power has a signicant im-
pact on the absolute priority violations, but that it only has a minor impact
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on the choice of capital structure and on the ex-ante optimally levered rm
value. Hackbarth et al. (2007) also consider anticipated deviations from ab-
solute priority that depend on the toughness of the bankruptcy regime, but
the violations are not a rational model outcome.
In addition, our model predicts that the bankruptcy costs have almost no
impact on the rm's optimal capital structure policy. In fact, in our model
the rm is always more valuable alive than liquidated, and debt renegotiation
ensures that liquidation never occurs. Hence, bankruptcy costs only aect
the o-the-equilibrium-path values of debt and equity and the size of the
APR violations. We do not address why restructurings occur in some cases
and liquidation in others, as in for example Broadie et al. (2007).
As noted, our model provides a number of empirical implications. Note,
however, that these empirical implications are relevant at recapitalization
points, i.e., for newly optimally levered rms. The distance between the
upper and lower boundary at which the rm is recapitalized, however, is
quite large. Therefore, the important caveat of Strebulaev (2007) applies,
i.e., cross-sectional analysis of leverage, which do not recognize that rms are
away from their optimal leverage most of the time, may not be consistent
with our predictions. In our model, the initial choice of leverage is a strong
predictor of future leverage, since that is the level of leverage to which rms
readjust when they recapitalize. This is consistent with the persistence on
leverage ratios found in Lemmon et al. (2008).
2. The Model
We consider a rm whose instantaneous earnings before interest and taxes
(EBIT), , follow a geometric Brownian motion under the risk neutral pricing
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measure, i.e.,
dt = tdt+ tdWt; (1)
with a given starting point, 0. The constants  and  are the drift and
volatility of , respectively, and W is a standard Brownian motion. We can
think of the origin of the EBIT process as the cash ow process generated by a
production technology initially owned by an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur
has the option to incorporate the rm (at a certain cost) based on the EBIT
process by issuing debt and equity.
We assume that the rm can issue a single class of callable perpetual
corporate debt with a xed instantaneous coupon, C. The call feature of
debt allows equity holders to better exploit the tax advantage to debt by
increasing the amount of outstanding debt when earnings increase. This is
an important feature to include in the model since it has a signicant impact
on optimal leverage as shown by Goldstein et al. (2001). Debt can only be
increased by calling the existing debt and subsequently issuing new debt.1
Debt is called at a premium, and there is a cost of issuing new debt which is
proportional to the principal.
The after-tax payment received by the debt holders on outstanding debt
with coupon C is (1 i)C, where i is the rate of personal interest taxes paid
by debt holders. Interest expenses are deductible before paying corporate
taxes at the rate c. Hence, the amount available for dividends to equity
holders is (1 c)( C). The dividend tax rate is d so the after-tax payment
1Otherwise, the equity holders have incentives to sequentially increase the outstanding
debt by issuing new debt with the same seniority, and thereby diluting the existing debt.
Of course, the debt holders rationally anticipate these incentives, see Leland (1994). Al-
ternative new additional debt can be issued with lower priority as, for example, in Dockner
et al. (2013) or Miltersen and Torous (2013).
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received by equity holders is (1  e)( C), where e = c+(1  c)d. This
assumes a symmetric tax refund if  < C. In practice, there is no tax refund
for negative earnings, but there can be loss carry forwards. To mimic this
friction, we assume the after-tax dividend received by equity holders is equal
to (1  e)( C) for  < C, where  2 [0; 1] is the eective tax refund used
when the earnings before taxes, EBT =    C, is negative.
We assume that there is a constant before tax riskless interest rate, r^.
Since interest income is taxable, the discount rate used for pricing under
the pricing measure is the after-tax riskless rate r = (1   i)r^. This reects
an assumption that not only is interest income taxed at the rate of i, but
there is also a tax subsidy at the rate of i associated with interest expenses.
Hence, in terms of dynamic replication of contingent claims, the eective
interest rate paid on the money market account used for borrowing in the
replicating portfolio is r. We assume throughout that  < r to ensure that
the cash ows generated from the EBIT process have a nite market value.
In all cases considered below, the restructuring policy is parameterized
by two boundaries: the renegotiation (or bankruptcy) boundary,

, and the
call boundary, . Obviously,

 < 0 < . That is, when  reaches the lower
boundary, the debt is renegotiated (or the rm is declared bankrupt), and
when  reaches the upper boundary, the debt is called. These boundaries
will be derived endogenously from the incentive compatibility constraints for
the equity holders, and they depend on the mechanism used for renegotiation
the rm's debt at the lower boundary. As a rst step in solving the model,
we take the boundaries and the pay-os at the boundaries as exogenously
given.
Debt and equity are time-homogeneous claims on the EBIT process, i.e.,
their values do not depend on calendar time. The payos depend only on the
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current level of EBIT, t, and the level of EBIT when the debt and equity
were issued, s; s  t. Therefore, we denote the price at date t of debt and
equity issued at some prior date s as D(t; s) and E(t; s), respectively.
Implicitly, this means that the EBIT process fugu2[s;t) has stayed inside the
interval (

; ) in the time period [s; t).
We show in AppendixA that both the debt and equity price functions
are positive homogeneous of degree one in (t; s) (cf. equation (A.6) in
AppendixA). That is,
D(ht;hs) = hD(t; s) (2)
and
E(ht;hs) = hE(t; s); (3)
for any t 2 [

; ] and h > 0. Moreover, note that this homogeneity property
implies that the restructuring policy (

; ) for each new issue of debt can be
written as (ds; us) for some xed positive constants d < 1 and u > 1.
Furthermore, for notational simplicity we write the initial values of debt
and equity at the issue date as
D(s; s) = sD(1; 1) = Ds
and
E(s; s) = sE(1; 1) = Es;
where D and E are constants dened as D = D(1; 1) and E = E(1; 1).
We dene the principal of the debt issued at date s with a coupon rate
cs to be the initial value of the debt Ds (cf. Part 1 of Conjecture 1 in
AppendixA). The debt is callable at a premium, , at any date t  s,
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i.e., the debt can be called (by the equity holders) at date t by paying the
debt holders (1 + )Ds.
2 When debt is issued, there are issuance costs, k,
proportional to the par value of the debt.3 Hence, the total proceeds to the
entrepreneur at date s for issuing both perpetual debt with a coupon rate
cs and equity is
A(s) = E(s; s)+(1 k)D(s; s) = s
 
E(1; 1)+(1 k)D(1; 1) = As; (4)
where A is a constant dened as
A = E(1; 1) + (1  k)D(1; 1) = E + (1  k)D:
For simplicity, assume debt is issued at date zero when the EBIT process is
initiated at 0. We rst look at boundary conditions at the upper boundary.
When the EBIT process  hits u0, the old debt is called at a premium,
, and new debt is issued with a higher coupon to obtain an increased tax
shield. That is, we have the following values of debt and equity at the call
boundary, u0,
D(u0; 0) = (1 + )D(0; 0)
= (1 + )D0
(5)
and
E(u0; 0) = E(u0;u0) + (1  k)D(u0;u0)  (1 + )D(0; 0)
=
 
Au  (1 + )D0: (6)
These equations are the value-matching conditions at the upper boundary
u0.
2Fischer et al. (1989b) and Flor and Lester (2002) study the ex-ante optimal size of
the call premium.
3These costs remove the equity holders' incentive to restructure the debt continuously
when there is no call premium, i.e. when  = 0, see footnote 1.
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2.1. Liquidation at the Lower Boundary
The key feature of our model is the renegotiation game at the lower
boundary. To be able to solve this model, we need as an intermediate step
to compute the value of the rm when there is no possibility of renegotiation
at the lower boundary d0. So that the debt holders' response to equity
holders withholding coupons is immediate liquidation. The claim to the
EBIT process is then acquired as a going concern by a new entrepreneur who
again can optimally lever the rm. A fraction, , of the proceeds covers the
bankruptcy costs. The net proceeds go rst to the debt holders to cover their
original principal, and if there is a surplus, it goes to the equity holders. This
is in accordance with the absolute priority rule. However, because the equity
holders have limited liability, the debt holders are in most cases not able to
recover their full principal. This happens when the proceeds from the sale
of assets less the bankruptcy costs are smaller than the original principal.
Hence, we get the following value-matching conditions at d0:
D(d0; 0) = min
n
(1  )A(d0); D(0; 0)
o
= min

(1  )Ad;D	0; (7)
and
E(d0; 0) = max
n
(1  )A(d0) D(0; 0); 0
o
= max

(1  )Ad D; 0	0: (8)
With these assumptions, we are able to price debt and equity for ex-
ogenously given boundaries by solving a xed-point problem for the two
unknowns E(1; 1) and D(1; 1).
We next take into account that the equity holders control the rm and
decide (i) when to call the debt and (ii) at each instant in time whether to
pay the coupons to the debt holders or not. That is, the incentives of the
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equity holders endogenously determine the restructuring policy, and both
equity and debt holders rationally anticipate these incentives already at debt
issuance. The equity holders nd it optimal to call the debt at u0 when the
following condition is fullled:
@
@
E(u0; 0) = A; (9)
where the partial derivative is with respect to the rst argument of the eq-
uity price function (; 0) 7! E(; 0). This condition is the smooth-pasting
condition at the upper boundary u0.
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Similarly, the equity holders nd it optimal to declare bankruptcy at d0
(by withholding the coupons) when the following smooth-pasting condition
is fullled:
@
@
E(d0; 0) = (1  )A 1f(1 )AdDg; (10)
where 1E is the indicator function for the event E .
Given the coupon rate C = c0, AppendixB shows how the value-matching
and smooth-pasting conditions determine the debt and equity price functions.
In particular, for  = 1 we get the constants E and D. Since the optimally
levered rm value, A = E + (1   k)D, is used in the boundary conditions
stated above, the derivation of the equity and debt prices (and the optimal
boundaries) is actually still a xed-point problem. Recall that E and D are
determined for a given coupon rate. In order to determine the optimally
levered rm value, we must (numerically) optimize over the coupon rate c.
4 This (or similar) smooth-pasting or high-contact conditions are used throughout the
literature, see, e.g., Merton (1973); Leland (1994); Mella-Barral (1999). Merton, foot-
note 60 gives an argument for the validity of this condition, but see also Dixit (1991),
Dixit (1993), Brekke and ksendal (1991), and Brekke and ksendal (1994) for explana-
tions of what type of optimality this condition leads to.
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With the optimal rate, c, the optimal capital structure policy of the rm is
characterized by the constants E;D; u; d, and c.
Up to this point, our model is similar to that of Goldstein et al. (2001)
but with one notable dierence: Goldstein et al. (2001) assume that the
rm's assets in bankruptcy are sold o at their unlevered value, which is
equal to (1   e)=(r   ). Hence, the debt and equity values are known
functions of  at the lower boundary. In our base case model, the liquidation
value of the rm at the lower boundary recognizes that the assets of the rm
can subsequently be optimally levered, i.e., the tax advantage to debt is not
lost at bankruptcy. Hence, our model leads to a xed-point problem when
solving for the initial values of debt and equity due to the optimally levered
rm value both at the lower boundary and the call boundary. A similar xed-
point problem due to restructuring at the call boundary has been studied in
Kane et al. (1985), Fischer et al. (1989a), and Goldstein et al. (2001).
2.2. Debt Renegotiation with Credible Threats
The going concern value of the rm is always larger than the value after
bankruptcy and, therefore, it is in the best interest of debt and equity holders
to avoid bankruptcy at the lower boundary. While one could easily add other
frictions that would make bankruptcy optimal in some cases, we focus on the
outcome of debt renegotiation. In most strategic debt service models, equity
holders make take-it-or-leave-it oers to the debt holders that just leave the
debt holders as well o as in a bankruptcy. Hence, equity holders get the
entire benet of the saved bankruptcy costs. The problem with these debt
renegotiation models is that it is not obvious that the equity holders' threat of
withholding the coupons, if the debt holders reject the restructuring proposal,
is a credible threat. In fact, it almost never is in these models. If the debt
holders declare the rm bankrupt, the equity holders would in most cases get
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nothing.5 Thus, if the equity holders' restructuring proposal is rejected by
the debt holders, they might prefer to continue paying the original coupon,
and thereby avoid bankruptcy.
In our model, the equity holders' proposal takes into account that accep-
tance by the debt holders depends on their conjecture of the equity holders'
rational response to a rejection. Equity holders may decide to continue pay-
ing coupons, but nothing prevents them from immediately proposing a new
restructuring. To close the model, we must introduce a friction leaving the
rm in a dierent state after a rejected renegotiation proposal so that an
identical restructuring proposal is not immediately proposed. The friction
we introduce is that the equity holders are only allowed to make a nite
number of renegotiation proposals. If there are no more renegotiation op-
tions, we end up in the model of the preceding section in which the only
response to equity withholding coupons is liquidation. The nite number of
renegotiation options implies that after a rejection, the rm is in a dierent
shape than it was before the proposal was presented. That is, the rm has
moved one step closer to a world with no possibility of restructuring.
The model is most easily understood in the case of one remaining renego-
tiation option, and we therefore consider this case in detail in what follows.
For this we need additional notation. We use a subscript to denote the num-
ber of remaining options. Thus, for example, E0(1; 1) now denotes the value
of equity in the model of the previous subsection, i.e., the value of equity
after we have taken into account the optimal call policy and the optimal liq-
uidation policy of the equity holders, and where the coupon has been chosen
5If the proposal is made for a very high level of EBIT it is possible that the default
value of the rm is higher than the initial debt holders' principal. This would leave some
value for equity holders.
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to optimize rm value. Similarly, E0(; 1) denotes the value of equity when
the EBIT process has moved to , but the capital structure and policies are
those determined when  was equal to 1.
Consider now the renegotiation game at the lower boundary, d0, at which
the equity holders make their restructuring proposal, which is their last re-
maining proposal. Let Ec1 denote the value of equity with one remaining
option based on the assumption that the restructuring proposal is rejected
and that the equity holders continue to pay the original coupon c1 (which
at this point is not to be thought of as chosen optimally). We can express
the value of continuing with the existing coupon using the function E0 which
presumes an optimal coupon of c0: To see this, note that paying the coupon
c1 would be optimal if the rm had been capitalized with zero remaining
options at the starting point c1=c

0.
6 We can therefore express the value of
equity with zero remaining options and coupon c1 as E0(d0; c1=c

0), which
captures the fact that equity will choose the optimal boundaries given the
coupon c1; but also that EBIT is now at d0. In other words, the value of
6This procedure of re-adjusting the initial level of the EBIT, 0, in order to properly
account for equity holders' optimal behavior with zero renegotiation options does have a
small issue in that the value we use for the debt principal with no renegotiation options
left may not be the same as was the case with one renegotiation options left even though
the coupon rate is right. However, this is only a minor inexactitude of our numerical
procedure for two reasons. (i) The principal will only play a role if either (a) the debt is
called or (b) if the rm is liquidated and the acquisition value of the rm net of bankruptcy
costs is higher than the principal. When the rm is in nancial distress neither (a) nor
(b) is the case and therefore the value of the debt is fairly insensitive to the exact size
of the principal of the debt. (ii) When we increase the number of options, our numerical
calculations show that the principal does approach the right size.
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equity when choosing to continue paying the existing coupon is
Ec1 = E0(d0; c1=c

0):
On the other hand, if the restructuring proposal is rejected and the equity
holders withhold the coupon payments, then the rm is declared bankrupt
(because we are then in the case with zero renegotiation options). This means
that the equity value based on the assumption that a rejection is followed by
liquidation is
Eb1 = max

(1  )A0d D1; 0
	
0:
Since the rm's going concern value in liquidation, A0, includes no options
to renegotiate. The choice of whether to continue to pay the original coupon
rate or to declare bankruptcy is in the hands of the equity holders. Hence, the
equity value, assuming that the proposal leads to rejection, is the maximum
of the two alternatives, i.e.,
Er1 = maxfEc1; Eb1g:
This value depends solely on values we know from solving the case with zero
renegotiation options. The corresponding debt value depends on the choice of
the equity holders. If the equity holders continue to pay the original coupon,
the debt value is
Dc1 = D0(d0; c1=c

0):
In this case, the debt holders are not in a position to force bankruptcy. On
the other hand, if the equity holders cease the coupon payments, the debt
holders immediately declare bankruptcy. The bankruptcy value of debt is
Db1 = min

(1  )A0d;D1
	
0:
If the debt holders reject the restructuring proposal, the value of debt is
Dr1 = D
c
11fEc1Eb1g +D
b
11fEc1<Eb1g:
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This is our assumption of credible threats. Debt holders rationally anticipate
whether upon a rejection it is in the interest of equity holders to continue
with the existing coupons or to liquidate. All values on the right hand side
are available from the case with zero renegotiation options.
Suppose instead the proposal is accepted. Then the joint value of debt
and equity is the optimally levered rm value, but now with no remaining
options to renegotiate, i.e,
Ea1 (d0; 0) +D
a
1(d0; 0) = A0d0: (11)
Hence, the joint gain from acceptance of the proposal is
R1 = A0d0   (Er1 +Dr1): (12)
This gain is based on the rational response of equity holders to a rejection of
their proposal. This gain is not computed using a potentially non-credible
threat of liquidation as the only alternative. Rather, it is a gain compared to
the optimal response by equity holders to a rejection. We assume that the
equity holders' bargaining power is exogenously given by  2 [0; 1]. That is,
the equity holders' restructuring proposal is such that they get the fraction 
of the restructuring gain. Hence, we can write the value-matching conditions
at the lower boundary, d0, as
E1(d0; 0) = R1 + E
r
1 ; (13)
and
D1(d0; 0) = (1  )R1 +Dr1: (14)
Clearly, the equity holders will not propose a restructuring unless the restruc-
turing gain is non-negative.7 Hence, the specication of the renegotiation
7If  = 0, we impose the constraint R  0.
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mechanism ensures that the debt holders accept the restructuring proposal.
This follows from the fact that both parties get a value which is at least as
high as the value they would get if the debt restructuring proposal is rejected.
The corresponding smooth-pasting condition at the renegotiation boundary
d10 is
@
@
E1(d10; 0) =
@
@

R1 + E
r
1
 
=d10
: (15)
At the call boundary, u10, the value-matching and smooth-pasting condi-
tions are equivalent to those used in the previous sections. Thus, the value-
matching conditions are
D1(u10; 0) = (1 + )D1(0; 0) = (1 + )D10; (16)
and
E1(u10; 0) =
 
A1u1   (1 + )D1

0; (17)
where
A1 = E1(1; 1) + (1  k)D1(1; 1):
Note that the optimally levered rm value, A1, in the equity holders' value-
matching condition (17) reects an assumption that renegotiation options
are not lost after a call. Moreover, the optimal call boundary fullls the
following smooth-pasting condition:
@
@
E1(u10; 0) = A1: (18)
Once we have established the optimal boundaries, we can optimize over the
initial coupon c1.
Let n denote the number of remaining renegotiation options. The proce-
dure for solving the model with one renegotiation option can now be summa-
rized as follows: When there are no renegotiation options left, i.e., n = 0, the
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only possibility at the lower boundary is to declare bankruptcy. In our aug-
mented notation, we characterize the solutions to this model by the constants
E0; D0; u0; d0, and c

0. Given these constants, we determine the debt and eq-
uity values in the last debt renegotiation game as follows. If the proposal is
accepted, the optimally levered rm value is A0d1s = (E0+(1 k)D0)d1s.8
On the other hand, suppose the proposal is rejected and it is optimal for
the equity holders to continue paying the existing coupons. In this case, the
rejection values of debt and equity are determined by the solution of the
model with n = 0, but using the existing coupon. Thus, we can solve for
the optimal capital structure policy assuming there is one remaining rene-
gotiation option. The policy is characterized by the constants E1; D1; u1; d1,
and c1. This backward induction procedure can now be continued to the
case of n remaining options by solving for En; Dn; un; dn, and c

n in terms
of En 1; Dn 1; un 1; dn 1, and cn 1. This completes the description of the
solution procedure for the equilibrium debt renegotiation model with n rene-
gotiation options.9
3. The Impact of Debt Renegotiation and Credible Threats
[Table 1 about here.]
[Figure 1 about here.]
8Here, s denotes the level of EBIT at the last restructuring date, when the existing
capital structure was xed. Thus, the current EBIT is  = d1s.
9A similar solution procedure is proposed by ksendal and Sulem (2005, Chapter 7) as
a method to approximate the solution to an impulse control problem by solving a series
of iterated optimal stopping time problems. Moreover, ksendal and Sulem (2005) show
that the proposed solution procedure leads to a solution for the optimal value function and
controls of the problem. In our setting, this corresponds to nding the optimally levered
rm value and the optimal restructuring policies.
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We rst explain the qualitative eects of having one renegotiation option
insisting that the renegotiation is based on credible threats. The eect is
best understood if we let all the bargaining power reside with equity holders,
i.e., we set  = 1. All other input parameters are given in Table 1. We focus
at the value functions near the optimal renegotiation boundary. Figure 1
depicts the optimally levered rm value with zero remaining renegotiation
options (A0). We also show the liquidation value ((1 )A0). For all values
of EBIT above the optimal renegotiation boundary ( = d10 = 0:272), equity
holders prefer to continue with the existing coupon rather than to liquidate
the rm (i.e., Ec1 > E
b
1). Since debt holders know it is in the best interest
of equity holders to continue servicing the debt with zero remaining options,
they will reject renegotiation proposals, based on a liquidation threat, made
when  > d10. Hence, equity holders optimally postpone their renegotiation
oer to the point at which liquidation becomes a credible threat (i.e.,  =
d10. In this way, they maximize the value of their remaining renegotiation
option. As a consequence, the debt value (D1 and also D
c
1) is larger than
the liquidation value for values of  above, but close to, the restructuring
boundary d10. This is what separates our model based on credible threats
from a model in which the threat of liquidation is not necessarily credible.
In a strategic debt service model based on non-credible liquidation threats,
the debt renegotiation oer may be proposed at a higher level of  than d10.
This implies that in these models, the debt value is always lower than the
liquidation value.
[Figure 2 about here.]
How large, then, are the quantitative eects of debt renegotiation backed
by credible threats? Figure 2 depicts the debt and equity values as well as
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the optimal coupon and the renegotiation and call boundaries as a function
of the number of renegotiation options. The optimal coupon, the optimal
leverage, and the optimally levered rm value all increase signicantly going
from a setting with liquidation at the lower boundary (n = 0) to a setting
with one renegotiation option (n = 1). Further increasing the number of
renegotiation options has only a minor eect on all relevant quantities. The
ex-ante value of the increased leverage can be measured by the dollar tax
advantage to debt (TAD) dened as the dierence between the optimally
levered rm value and the unlevered rm value. TAD increases from 2.04
with n = 0 to 2.83 with n = 1 and 3.06 with n = 8. Hence, the possibility
of debt renegotiation increases TAD by 50% even when debt renegotiation
proposals must be backed by credible threats.
Trade-o models with costs of calling and issuing debt tend to have wide
boundaries within which EBIT can uctuate before the rm's capital struc-
ture is re-optimized. In our base case, the lower renegotiation boundary is
at 27% of initial EBIT and debt is called when EBIT has increased by a
factor of approximately 2.5. These boundaries narrow only slightly when the
number of renegotiation options increases. Therefore, the important caveat
of Strebulaev (2007) applies, i.e., cross-sectional analysis of leverage ratios,
which do not recognize that rms are away from their optimal leverage most
of the time, may not be consistent with our predictions.
4. Implications for Capital Structure and APR violations
[Figure 3 about here.]
In Figure 3 we examine the impact of changing the equity holders' bargain-
ing power, , which determines the distribution of the renegotiation gain
between equity holders and debt holders. We leave all other parameters as
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they are in the base case, cf. Table 1, and we focus on the setting with
\many" renegotiation oers (n = 8). Interestingly, the bargaining power has
only a limited impact on the optimally levered rm value. Optimal lever-
age decreases somewhat with , cf. Panel 3a, but the bargaining power has
a signicant inuence on absolute priority (APR) violations (dened as the
fraction of the rm value that is allocated to equity at the time of renego-
tiation), cf. Panel 3b. Lowering the equity holders' bargaining power from
one down to zero reduces the size of the absolute priority violation virtually
linearly down to zero as well. When the rm's capital structure is optimized,
the objective is total rm value maximization. Therefore, it is not a rst-
order eect how equity holders and debt holders eventually share the rm
value at each renegotiation. Consequently, the optimally levered rm value
does not vary with the equity holders' bargaining power, . On the other
hand, equity holders postpone their renegotiation proposal until the threat
of liquidation becomes credible and, hence, at each round of renegotiations
equity holders get a fraction,  of the saved bankruptcy costs.
Note from Panel 3c that the recovery rate of debt in renegotiation (de-
ned as the fraction of debt principal received by debt holders at the time
of renegotiation) is relatively unaected by the equity holders' bargaining
power. This is because the bargaining power only determines the allocation
of the renegotiation gains, i.e., debt holders get the liquidation value of the
rm plus their fraction of the renegotiation gain.
Empirical research reveals that APR violations are common, but recent
evidence also points to the fact that violations have become less frequent
and of smaller magnitude. In the 1980s, APR violations occur as often as in
75% of the U.S. Chapter 11 cases and equity received on average 7.6% of the
reorganized rm's value, see Franks and Torous (1989), Franks and Torous
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(1994), Eberhart et al. (1990a), Weiss (1990), and Betker (1995). Within
the last decade, however, Bharath et al. (2010) report that the empirical evi-
dence on APR violations has changed. In the period 1991{2005, the average
frequency of violations decreased to 22%. Also, the magnitude of absolute
priority violations has declined from 10% of rm value to less than 2% of rm
value. Bharath et al. (2010) suggest that these changes are due to Chapter
11 becoming more creditor friendly in recent years, e.g., due to increasing re-
liance on debtor-in-possession (DIP) nancing. Similarly, Senbet and Wang
(2010) point to the fact that there have been several innovations related to
the bankruptcy reorganization process in recent years starting in the 1990s.
The essence is that creditors have gained stronger bargaining power in the
recent years at the expense of equity holders. While our model can only make
the APR violations disappear by assigning zero bargaining power to equity
holders|and therefore has less to say about the frequency of violations|it
clearly implies that lowering the bargaining power lowers the size of the APR
violations. Note also, that the size of the violation is still small relative to
rm value, and therefore, the recovery value of debt is fairly insensitive to the
bargaining power of equity holders. The strength of the position of creditors
in a bankruptcy or renegotiation is often proxied by creditor dispersion, and
we would therefore expect to see no signicant eect of creditor dispersion
on recovery values of debt. This is consistent with the evidence found in
Acharya et al. (2007). In summary, the distribution of bargaining power, ,
has only a minor impact on the capital structure choice and on debt recovery,
but it signicantly aects the size of the APR violation.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Bankruptcy costs, , turn out to play a role similar to that of the bargaining
power, . As we learn from Figure 4, bankruptcy costs have a limited impact
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on the choice of capital structure and debt recovery, but they do aect the
size of the APR violation. Lowering the bankruptcy costs down to zero
reduce the size of the absolute priority violation virtually linearly down to
zero as well.
On the equilibrium path the rm's capital structure will be renegotiated
n times before bankruptcy may eventually occur. Hence, from an ex-ante
perspective the present value of the bankruptcy costs are very small. On the
other hand, o the equilibrium path, equity holders eectively threaten to
declare immediate bankruptcy (in the sense that they wait to propose their
renegotiation proposal until the threat of liquidation becomes credible) and,
hence, at each round of renegotiations, equity holders get half (in general a
share equal to ) of the saved bankruptcy costs.
[Figure 5 about here.]
In Figure 5 we examine the impact of the volatility of EBIT. Volatility does
not aect the size of the APR violations, and it has only a limited eect on
debt recovery, again consistent with the empirical evidence found in Acharya
et al. (2007). Unsurprisingly, a higher volatility increases the equity value,
and it decreases the leverage and thereby the tax advantage to debt. Un-
reported results show that yield spreads increase, while the renegotiation
boundary decrease in the volatility. These results are consistent with other
dynamic capital structure models. In models with no debt renegotiation,
the equity holders receive no value at the lower boundary and, hence, the
equity holders' claim is like a call option. Thus, it is not surprising that a
higher volatility lowers the bankruptcy boundary. Despite the fact that the
equity holders get a positive value at the lower boundary with debt renego-
tiation, we see a similar phenomenon. That is, the equity holders postpone
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the debt renegotiation even though this reduces the equity value they can
obtain as the outcome of a debt renegotiation. Similarly, as a consequence of
the reduction in the debt renegotiation boundary, debt recovery decreases as
a function of the volatility, but only to a limited extend since the principal
of the debt also decreases.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we study a dynamic trade-o model of a rm's capital struc-
ture in which there is renegotiation of debt when the rm does poorly. A
critical feature of our model is that debt holders reject renegotiation oers
from equity holders which are not credible. Our model shows that violation
of the absolute priority rule is an optimal outcome of the renegotiation pro-
cess. Hence, violations of the absolute priority rule can arise with no other
frictions than taxes and bankruptcy costs. We nd that the equity holders'
bargaining power and the bankruptcy costs aect the size of the absolute
priority violation, but none of these two parameters have any major impact
on the optimal capital structure of the rm. They also have very little impact
on debt recovery. Earnings (and thereby asset) volatility, which has a signif-
icant impact on the optimal capital structure choice, has virtually no impact
on the size of the violations of absolute priority. Our results are consistent
with other trade-o models in that it predicts large variations in leverage
before it becomes optimal for rms to realign their capital structure either
by renegotiating their debt terms or by issuing new securities.
Our model does not capture why some rms end up continuing operation
after a debt renegotiation while others end up being liquidated. In our model,
the rm is always more valuable as a going concern than liquidated|and as
such the possibility of renegotiation is a social improvement in the sense that
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it reduces the deadweight cost of bankruptcy. The model can be extended
in at least two ways to include this feature. Either we can introduce an
exogenously given probability that the debt and equity holders cannot reach
an agreement of how to restructure the rm, or we can introduce a second
state variable measuring the value of the rm's assets. In the latter case, the
rm may be liquidated simply because the rm's assets are more valuable
than the present value of the EBIT process optimally levered. For example,
the assets may be used for some other purpose than generating the current
EBIT. One attempt in this direction is Flor (2008).
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Figure 1: The value functions of the claims of the rm. The value functions
are depicted as a function of the current EBIT value, . The gure con-
centrates on the value functions for low values of EBIT between the lower
renegotiation (or bankruptcy) boundary and the initial value,  = 1. All
parameters are as in the base case in Table 1, except that all the bargaining
power reside with the equity holders, i.e.,  = 1. E1 is the equity value func-
tion with one renegotiation option left, D1 is the debt value function with
one renegotiation option left (since  = 1, this will also be the value of the
debt if the renegotiation proposal is rejected and the equity holders decide
to continue with the existing coupon, denoted Dc1 in the text), E
c
1 and E
b
1
are the values of equity if their renegotiation proposal is rejected. Ec1 is the
value if equity holders decide to continue with the existing coupon and Eb1 is
the value if they declare immediate bankruptcy. A0 is the optimally levered
rm value if the rm is restructured at , and (1   )A0 is the optimally
levered rm value after liquidation at .
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is the upper restructuring boundary, dn
is the lower renegotiation (or for n = 0
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rm value, Dn
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Figure 2: Upper and lower restructuring boundaries, optimal coupon rate,
and values of claims on the rm at the time when debt is issued and the rm's
capital structure is optimized, i.e., when  = 1. The values are depicted as a
function of the number of renegotiation options, n. All other parameters are
as in the base case in Table 1.
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Figure 3: Values of claims on the rm, APR violations, and debt recovery
rates as a function of the bargaining power distribution between equity hold-
ers and debt holders, . All other parameters are as in the base case in
Table 1.  = 1 means that the equity holders have all the bargaining power
whereas  = 0 means that debt holders have all the bargaining power.
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Figure 4: Values of claims on the rm, APR violations, and debt recovery
rates as a function of the bankruptcy costs, . All other parameters are as
in the base case in Table 1.
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Figure 5: Values of claims on the rm, APR violations, and debt recovery
rates as a function of the EBIT volatility, . All other parameters are as in
the base case in Table 1.
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Risk neutral drift of the EBIT process  2%
Volatility of the EBIT process  25%
After-tax riskless interest rate r 4.5%
Tax rate on interest payments i 35%
Eective tax rate on dividends e 50%
Debt call premium  5%
Bankruptcy costs  25%
Issuing costs of new debt k 3%
Equity holders' bargaining power  50%
Eective tax refund  50%
Table 1: Base case parameter values.
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AppendixA. Fixed Point Solution to the Pricing of Debt and Eq-
uity (Online appendix)
To set up some notation, we quickly reiterate parts of the standard theory.
First, consider a very simple claim paying one unit of account when  hits
the lower boundary,

, but only if the lower boundary has been hit before
the upper boundary, . The price, denoted

P , of this claim as a function of
the current level of EBIT, , can be derived as

P () =
 x2x1 + x1x2

;  2 [

; ];
where
x1 =
(1
2
2   ) +
q
(  1
2
2)2 + 2r2
2
;
x2 =
(1
2
2   ) 
q
(  1
2
2)2 + 2r2
2
;
and
 = x1

x2  

x1 x2 :
This follows from the fact that

P solves the linear ordinary dierential equa-
tion (ODE)
1
2
22

P 00() + 

P 0()  r

P () = 0; (A.1)
with the boundary conditions

P (

) = 1 and

P () = 0:
Similarly, interchanging the boundary conditions, we nd the price of a claim
paying one unit of account when  hits the upper boundary, , but only if
the upper boundary has been hit before the lower boundary,

. The price,
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denoted P , of this claim as a function of the current level of EBIT, , can be
derived as
P () = 
x2x1  

x1x2

;  2 [

; ]:
We also need a claim that pays a dividend stream at the rate s + b at any
date s 2 [t;1). The date t value of this claim can easily be derived (either
using risk neutral expectations or Gordon's formula) as
t +B;
where
 =

r    and B =
b
r
:
With these three claims priced we are able to price all claims of interest in
our model. Consider the claim which pays o a dividend stream at the rate
t+ b at any date, t, until one of the boundaries has been hit. When it hits
one of the boundaries, it pays out a nal lump-sum payment. If the lower
boundary,

, has been hit rst, it pays out

F , and if the upper boundary, ,
has been hit rst, it pays out F . The price, denoted F (; ; b;

;

F; ; F ), of
this claim as a function of the current level of EBIT, , can easily be derived
as
F (; ; b;

;

F; ; F ) = +B+(

F 

 B)

P ()+( F  B) P ();  2 [

; ]:
(A.2)
Equation (A.2) has the following easy interpretation: The date t value of
getting the dividend stream at the rate s + b at any date s 2 [t;1) is
t +B. Eventually  will hit either

 or . If, e.g.,

 has been hit rst, the
claim pays out

F and the rest of the dividend stream (with a value of 

+B)
is forgone. The net present value of this seen from date t is (

F 

 B)

P (t).
The same argument applies for the upper boundary, .
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Plugging in the denitions of

P and P reveals10
F (; ; b;

;

F; ; F ) =
1

 
( F    B)

x2   (

F  

  B)x2x1
+
1

 
(

F  

  B)x1   ( F    B)

x1

x2
+ +B;  2 [

; ]:
(A.5)
A very useful property of the price function, F , is the following positive
homogeneity of degree one property
F (h; ; hb; h

; h

F; h; h F ) = hF (; ; b;

;

F; ; F ); (A.6)
for any  2 [

; ] and h 2 R+. This is very easily checked by directly applying
equation (A.5).11
10Alternatively, equation (A.5) can be derived by observing that F is the solution to
the inhomogeneous ODE (suppressing , b,

,

F , , and F in the notation for F )
1
2
22F 00() + F 0()  rF () +  + b = 0; (A.3)
with the boundary conditions
F (

) =

F and F () = F:
Recall that the general solution to the ODE (A.3) is
F (; ; b;

;

F; ; F ) = k1
x1 + k2
x2 +

r    +
b
r
;  2 [

; ]; (A.4)
where k1 and k2 are determined by the boundary conditions. Simple manipulations reveal
that
k1 =
1

 
( F    B)

x2   (

F  

  B)x2
and
k2 =
1

 
(

F  

  B)x1   ( F    B)

x1

:
11That it is true for any  2 (

; ) follows directly. That it is also true for  2 f

; g must
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The economic intuition behind this homogeneity property is quite trivial:
if the unit of account was changed, e.g., from $ to e, on all inputs, then
also the value will change accordingly from being measured in $ to being
measured in e. This result heavily relies on the scaling invariant feature
of the geometric Brownian motion and that everything except for monetary
units is specied in rates.
With this machinery in place we return to the problem of nding the
optimal dynamic capital structure of the rm and the values of debt and
equity. Basically, debt and equity are claims of the form F just derived. We
just have to nd , b,

,

F , , and F for both debt and equity.
In order to nd the after-tax payout rate,  + b, on debt and equity
we need to know the tax rules and payout rates. Here, we briey recap the
structure from Section 2. Coupon payments paid out to the debt holders are
expenses for the rm, i.e. they are subtracted from the EBIT before the rm
pays corporate tax. Hence, the total tax paid on coupons is the personal
interest tax paid by the debt holders. For dividends the rm must rst pay
tax on its EBT before dividends can be paid out to the equity holders. On
top of that the equity holders pay dividend tax on dividends paid out. Hence,
the after-tax payout rate,  + b, on debt is specied as
 + b = (1  i)C
be checked separately. It comes from the fact that F (

) =

F and F () = F . The reason
why, e.g., F () = F is because if  =  then the upper boundary is hit immediately and
therefore (i) there is no waiting time until one of the two boundaries will be hit and (ii)
there is zero probability that the lower boundary will be hit before the upper boundary.
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and for equity it is specied as
 + b =
8><>:(1  e)(   C); if   C;(1  e)(   C); if  < C:
Here e denotes the eective tax rate on dividends. That is,
e = c + (1  c)d;
where c denotes the corporate tax rate, and d denotes the personal dividend
tax rate.  denotes the eective tax refund when EBT is negative. The
values assigned to  and b for debt and equity are summarized in Table B.2.
By adding the payout rates of debt and equity we see that there is a tax
advantage to debt if and only if the eective tax rate on dividends is higher
than the personal tax on interest payments, i.e. e > i, when EBT is positive,
i.e.   C. However, for  < C it is possible that there can be a tax
disadvantage to debt. This happens when e < i. For the rest of the paper
we assume that e > i such that there is a tax advantage to debt for positive
EBT. This implies that the optimal capital structure of the rm will include
some debt.
[Table 2 about here.]
For a given (optimal) coupon rate, C, on the debt, and a given restructuring
policy, (

; ) (determined endogenously in the model when the debt was
issued, e.g. at date zero when the EBIT process was 0), we must specify
the value of debt and equity when one of the restructuring boundaries has
been hit. However, contrary to a static capital structure model these values
are not known since when the restructuring boundaries have been hit, the
(possible new) owner will again issue debt and equity and continue operation.
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To establish some notation we denote these values (the notation is obvious)
as

D, D,

E, and E. Furthermore, denote the earliest date after the debt issue
when a restructuring boundary has been hit as  . Since the situation at date
 , when the (possible new) owner of the whole rm reissues new debt, is
exactly identical to the situation at date zero when the original entrepreneur
issued the original debt|except that the EBIT process is now  instead
of 0|we conjecture that the coupon rate of the newly issued debt will be

0
C at date  , the new restructuring policy will be ( 
0
; 
0
), and the new
boundary values will be 
0 
D, 
0
D, 
0 
E, and 
0
E. In fact, we will later prove
that this conjecture is correct. We state our conjecture formally below.
Conjecture 1. 1. The optimal coupon rate C determined just prior to
issuing the debt at a given date s when the EBIT process is s can be
written as
C = cs;
for a given constant c.
2. The incentive compatible restructuring policy (

; ), which is common
knowledge as soon as the coupon rate C is xed at a given date s when
the EBIT process is s, can be written as

 = ds
and
 = us;
for given constants d 2 (0; 1) and u 2 (1;1).
3. The values of debt and equity when one of the boundaries (induced by
the commonly known restructuring policy xed by the optimally deter-
mined coupon rate at a given date s when the EBIT process is s) has
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been hit can be written as

D =

ds;
D = ds;

E =

es;
and
E = es;
for given constants

d, d,

e, and e.
Given Conjecture 1 we can derive (and denote) the price at any given date
t, when the EBIT process is t, of debt and equity issued at some date s  t,
when the EBIT process was s, provided that the EBIT process fugu2[s;t] in
the time period [s; t) has stayed inside the interval (ds; us), as
D(t; s) = F (t; 0; (1  i)cs; ds;

ds; us; ds)
and
E(t; s) = F (t; 1  e; (1  e)cs; ds;

es; us; es): (A.7)
To be exact, the equity value, E, has only the form (A.7) if c  d. This is
due to the asymmetric tax regime the equity holders face. They have to pay
the tax rate e when the rm's EBT is positive, but they can only deduct
at the tax rate e when the rm's EBT is negative. Hence, if c
 2 (d; u),
the equity value is pieced together in the following way to ensure that it is
one-time continuously dierentiable
E(t; s) =
8><>:F (t; 1  e; (1  e)c
s; ds;

es; c
s; es); if t < cs;
F (t; 1  e; (1  e)cs; cs; es; us; es); if t  cs:
(A.8)
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Here, e is the equity value when t = c and s = 1. This value is determined
by requiring the equity value function, E, to be continuously dierentiable in
the rst variable at the point t = c
s.12 Finally, if c  u, the rm always
has negative earnings net of coupon payments, so E has the form
E(t; s) = F (t; 1  e; (1  e)cs; ds;

es; us; es):
AppendixB. Verication of Conjecture 1 (Online appendix)
In this appendix we verify that there exists solutions to debt and equity
that fullls Conjecture 1. Equations (5), (6), (7), and (8) immediately verify
part 3 of Conjecture 1 and that

d = min

(1  )Ad;D	;
d = (1 + )D;

e = max

(1  )Ad D; 0	;
and
e = Au  (1 + )D:
For given c, d, and u, the two constants D and E can be found by solving
for the initial debt and equity values for t = s = 1. That is, using the
12Formally, we have to add the condition that the equity value at the point where the
two parts are pieced together in a one-time continuously dierentiable way can be written
as es to our Conjecture 1. That is, we have to add to part 3 of Conjecture 1 that the
value of equity, at the point where t = c
s, can be written as
E(cs; s) = es
for a given constant e.
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expression of F from equation (A.2) we have the following two equations in
two unknowns13
D = D
 
1  d

P (1)  u P (1)+BD 1 

P (1)  P (1)
+min

(1  )Ad;D	

P (1) + (1 + )D P (1)
and
E = E
 
1  d

P (1)  u P (1)+BE 1 

P (1)  P (1)
+max

(1  )Ad D; 0	

P (1) +
 
Au  (1 + )D P (1):
Here,
D = 0; E =
(1  e)
r    ; BD =
c
r
; and BE =
 (1  e)c
r
:
For a given c, we can nd d and u by the two smooth pasting conditions,
equations (9) and (10). Unfortunately, these two equations in two unknowns
can only be solved numerically. However, by Euler's theorem E1(t; s) is
positive homogeneous of degree zero because E(t; s) itself is positive homo-
geneous of degree one, cf. equation (3). That is,
E1(ht;hs) = E1(t; s);
for any t 2 [ds; us] and h 2 R+. Hence, equations (9) and (10) are identical
independent of the actual level of 0. Therefore, the solutions d and u are
also independent of the actual level of 0. That is, we have veried part 2 of
Conjecture 1.14
13If c 2 (d; u), there are three unknowns: D, E, and e. The third equation comes
from dierentiability of the equity function, E, at t = c
s, cf. equation (A.8).
14In fact, this positive homogeneity property of degree zero of E1(t; s) can also be
used to verify that e is independent of the actual level of 0. This veries the missing
conjecture in the case where c 2 (d; u), cf. footnote 12.
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Finally, the optimal coupon rate of the debt, which is determined just
prior to the debt issue at date zero, is given by
C = argmax
C2R+
A(0):
That is so because it is the original entrepreneur who determines the coupon
rate of the perpetual debt that he or she would like to issue. Naturally, the
entrepreneur sets the coupon rate in order to maximize his or her own value.
Moreover, rewriting C as c0 gives exactly the same optimization problem
since 0 is positive
C = argmax
C2R+
A(0) = 0
 
argmax
c2R+
A(0)
0

:
Plugging in the denition of A(0) from equation (4) gives
c = argmax
c2R+
E(0; 0) + (1  k)D(0; 0)
0
= argmax
c2R+

F (0; 1  e; (1  e)c0; d(c)0;

e(c)0; u(c)0; e(c)0)
0
+ (1  k)F (0; 0; (1  i)c0; d(c)0;d(c)0; u(c)0;
d(c)0)
0

= argmax
c2R+
 
F (1; 1  e; (1  e)c; d(c);

e(c); u(c); e(c))
+ (1  k)F (1; 0; (1  i)c; d(c);

d(c); u(c); d(c))

:
Note that we have emphasized the dependence of d, u,

d, d,

e, and e on the
given coupon rate parameter, c, cf. part 2 and 3 of Conjecture 1. Finally,
notice that the optimal coupon rate parameter, c, in the above optimization
is independent of the initial level 0 so we have veried the missing part
(part 1) in Conjecture 1. That is, we have now veried that there exists
a xed-point solution to our debt and equity valuation problem giving us
solutions to the value of debt and equity fullling Conjecture 1. Because
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of our conjecture-verication method of nding the xed-point solution, we
cannot rule out that there might be other xed-point solutions which do not
fulll Conjecture 1.
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 b
D 0 (1  i)C
EC 1  e  (1  e)C
E<C 1  e  (1  e)C
D + EC 1  e (e   i)C
D + E<C 1  e (e   i)C
Table B.2: Values for  and b for debt (D) and equity (E) both when EBT
is positive and when it is negative.
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